NATURAL MORALITIES  This page intentionally left blank  NATURAL MORALITIES  A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism  David B. Wong   1     2006  1  Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further  Oxford University’s objective of excellence  in research, scholarship, and education.  Oxford     New York  Auckland     Cape Town      Dar es Salaam      Hong Kong      Karachi  Kuala Lumpur       Madrid     Melbourne     Mexico City      Nairobi  New Delhi     Shanghai     Taipei    Toronto  With of?ces in  Argentina    Austria    Brazil   Chile   Czech Republic      France    Greece  Guatemala      Hungary     Italy  Japan    Poland    Portugal    Singapore  South Korea      Switzerland    Thailand    Turkey     Ukraine    Vietnam  Copyright  2006 by Oxford University Press, Inc.  Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.  198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016  www.surmtyb.com.cn  Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,  stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,  electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,  without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data  Wong, David B.  Natural moralities : a defense of pluralistic relativism / David B. Wong.     p.   cm.  Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.  ISBN-13 978-0-19-530539-5  ISBN 0-19-530539-6  1.  Ethical relativism.   I. Title.  BJ37.W66 2006  171'.7—dc22         2005056286  9  8 7  6  5 4  3  2 1  Printed in the United States of America  on acid-free paper  For Laura  This page intentionally left blank             Acknowledgments                am fortunate to have Lawrence Blum and Owen Flanagan as good friends             Iand philosophical interlocutors. They have shown me how philosophers  can  grapple  with  what  is  most  important,  not  necessarily  with  what  is  most  easily  regimented or managed by one’s favored philosophical method. They have shown me  that striving to understand what is most important should take us across methodo-  logical and subject boundaries that divide philosophers from each other (has it struck  anyone else how much the meeting rooms at the American Philosophical Association  are like little islands?) and also across boundaries that separate philosophers from other  humanistic and scienti?c disciplines. I have been stimulated and sustained by philo-  sophical discussion groups that over the years have included Blum and Flanagan, Judith  DeCew, Janet Farrell Smith, Sally Haslanger, Thomas Hill, Jr., Martha Minow, Steven                                                             ′ Nathanson, Jennifer Radin, Margaret Rhodes, Amelie Rorty, Geoffrey Sayre McCord,  David Wilkins, Kenneth Winkler, Kenneth Winston, and Michael Zimmerman. I have  been able to weave into this book themes from Chinese philosophy and comparative  ethics,  and  in  this  part  of  my  work  I  have  received  a  great  deal  of  encouragement,  stimulation, and challenge from Kwong-loi Shun, Joseph Chan, Antonio Cua, Chad  Hansen,  P. J. Ivanhoe,  Xinyan  Jiang,  Henry Rosemont,  Jr., Bryan  Van Norden, and  Jiyuan  Yu.  My  colleagues  at  Duke—especially  Flanagan,  Martin  Golding,  and  Alex-  ander Rosenberg—have been generous with their time and talents in providing me with  feedback  and  suggestions.  Boris  Kukso  and  Marion  Hourdequin  provided  helpful  comments on drafts of this book. Work on this book was supported by fellowships  from the American Council of Learned Societies and the National Endowment for the  Humanities. My thanks go to Peter Ohlin for his stewardship of this book.  This page intentionally left blank            Contents     Introduction, xi     Part I How Pluralism and Naturalism Make for Natural Moralities  1 Pluralism and Ambivalence, 5  2  Pluralistic Relativism, 29  3 Objections and Replies, 76     Part II Constraints on Natura

【倫理學】自然道德.pdf